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Abstract: 
Italy’s first Fascist government applied a large-scale privatization policy between 
1922 and 1925. The government privatized the state monopoly of match sale, 
eliminated the State monopoly on life insurances, sold most of the State-owned 
telephone networks and services to private firms, reprivatized the largest metal 
machinery producer, and awarded concessions to private firms to build and operate 
motorways. While ideological considerations may have had a certain influence, 
privatization was used mainly as a political tool to build confidence among 
industrialists and to increase support for the government and the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista. Privatization also contributed to balancing the budget, which was the core 
objective of Fascist economic policy in its first phase.  
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Resum: 
El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran 
escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el 
monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i 
serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major 
productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per 
construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions 
ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre 
tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per 
augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització 
també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el 
principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.  
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FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE:  PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN 1920’s 
FASCIST ITALY 
 
For a long time, the conventional wisdom on the history of privatization has been 
that the first privatization policies were implemented in the mid-1970s and early 
1980s Chile and in the 1980s and early 1990s in the United Kingdom.1 However, 
some scholars identify the partial sale of State-owned enterprises in Germany under 
Adenauer’s government (1959-1965) as the first privatization program;2 and others 
go back further; recently published works document and analyze the Nazis’ large-
scale privatization policy, implemented by Hitler’s government in pre-war 
Germany between 1934 and 1937.3 More recent studies4 have also explored another 
major privatization policy of the first half of the twentieth century, applied in 
Puerto Rico in 1948-1950, under the island’s first ever democratically-elected 
government. 
 Interestingly, the question of privatization (still termed denationalization) was 
frequently discussed in the early 1920s. In France in 1923, the privatization of the 
public monopolies on tobacco and matches was debated as a means of alleviating 
the problem of the public debt created by World War I, though the Commission 
created by the French government to study the issue eventually decided against 
                                                 
1 Bortolotti and Milella, “Privatization in Western”, p. 32; Yergin and Stanislaw, Commanding 
heights, p. 115. 
2 Megginson, Financial economics, p. 15; Schipke, Why Do Governments Divest?, p. 50. Other 
scholars argue that denationalization of steel in the UK in 1953 was the first privatization 
operation (Burk, The first privatization). 
3 Bel, “The coining of ‘privatization’”; Bel, “Against the mainstream”. Between 1934 and 1937, 
the Nazi regime privatized almost all firms that had been taken over by the Weimar government 
during the Great Depression. 
4 Bel, “The first privatization policy in a democracy”. 
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privatization.5 In the USSR as well the creation of mixed enterprises and the 
awarding of concessions to private firms was considered. In December 1922, the 
government member Lev Kamenev read a report (prepared by Lenin) at the 10th 
Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow which explained that more than 500 
applications for concessions and mixed commercial organizations had been 
received in 1922, of which 25 had been granted and 250 were under examination. 
Commenting on the new economic policy, Kamenev added: ‘Our aim is to put at 
the disposal of private capital only those branches of industry which we have not 
concentrated in the hands of the State….As for private capital, it disposes of what it 
can obtain from denationalisation and concessions”. 6 
The most important public debates on privatization in the early 1920s were 
sparked by the proposals to privatize railways in Switzerland, Germany, Belgium 
and Italy. In 1921, a Swiss committee of financial and technical experts proposed 
the lease of the State railways to a private concern, as a way of securing the 
government a revenue that was high enough to pay the railway loans.7 The issue 
was discussed at length; The Economist reported that “many people are demanding 
some form of denationalisation of the Federal Railways”.8 
In Germany, the government set up a committee in 1920 to study the financial 
state of the railways. The committee concluded that it was impossible to raise the 
fees charged for State services in line with the increase in costs. The minister 
suggested converting the State construction and repair workshops into independent 
organizations under commercial leadership: “This proposed denationalisation 
accords with the recommendation of both Socialisation Commissions.” 9 
                                                 
5 The Economist, 21 April 21 1923, pp. 842-843 (vol. 96, issue 4156). 
6 The Economist, 3 February 1923, p. 212 (vol. 96, issue 4145). 
7 The Economist, 30 April 1921, p. 875 (vol. 92, issue 4053. 
8 The Economist, 31 December 1921, p. 1159 (vol. 93, issue 4088). 
9 The Economist, 13 November 1920, p. 866 (vol. 91, issue 4029). 
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Privatization met with strong opposition in Germany, as the unions were “against 
any ‘regeneration of the principles of private business’ of the State railways, which 
would take the form of denationalisation; and an official statement declares that the 
railways will ‘in principle,’ as heretofore, remain a State concern.” 10 
Though plans to privatize the railways came to nothing in Switzerland and 
Germany, they met with success in Belgium. The Belgian government had partially 
denationalized the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Katanga (Katanga Railways) 
in the Congo by selling shares to Belgian investors in 1919, but had retained 
control over its management. The main reason for the partial sale of the railways in 
the Congo was financial, that is, the urgent necessity to stabilize the national 
currency.11 Later, in 1926, the government partially denationalized the Belgian 
railway, while once again retaining control over the firm.12 
In Italy, the debate on the privatization of the railways was particularly 
intense. Until 1865, the State and 22 private companies had owned different parts 
of the railway network. In that year the government privatized all publicly owned 
railway lines, transferring them to private companies already in business; later, 
however, in 1905, the railway system was nationalized. In a speech given in 
November 1921, Benito Mussolini, still in opposition, announced his intention to 
return the railways to the private sector,13 with full transfer of ownership and 
control. Indeed, the Program of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF henceforth), 
                                                 
10 The Economist, 9 June 1923, p. 1298 (vol. 96, issue 4163). 
11 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Re-privatizing, p. 12; Neville, Denationalisation, 
p. 31.  
12 Neville, Denationalisation, p. 35. 
13 Mussolini, “Discorso all’Augusteo”, 7 November 1921 (printed in Mussolini, Scritti e Discorsi 
II, pp. 203-204) 
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published in November 1921, explicitly proposed the privatization of the State 
railways.14 
After Mussolini’s accession to government on October 28, 1922, the plans for 
railway privatization began to make progress. In April 1923, the Council of 
Ministers discussed the issue15 and decided to begin by leasing the management of 
regional lines in the north and in Sicily to private firms. A Royal Decree was 
prepared, but its publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale was withdrawn at the last 
moment (even though the King had already signed it) because of the strong 
opposition from the Fascist railwaymen’s union.16 The government did not 
immediately abandon its plan to privatize the railways. In a speech given in Milan 
on May 13, 1923, Alberto De’ Stefani, Minister of Finance, commented on the 
expected reduction in railways’ deficit, noting that the deficit was to decrease 
steadily until 1924-25, and added that “the railways’ finances will be balanced in 
1925-1926, without prejudicing the possible transfer of the railways to private 
industry”.17 But although the privatization of the railways was often discussed in 
the first years of Fascism in Italy,18 the measure was never implemented. 
The failure of the Fascist government to privatize the railways was an 
exception rather than the general rule regarding privatization in Italy, because a 
wide-ranging privatization policy was indeed put into practice between 1922 and 
1925. Mussolini’s government privatized the State monopoly on match sale, and 
                                                 
14 This was included in point eight of the section Economic reconstruction of the country: 
Immediate objectives (Programma del Partito Nazionale Fascista, reprinted in De Felice, 
Autobiografia del Fascismo, pp. 116-125). 
15 Fausto, “L’economia del fascismo”, p. 8. 
16 See Barone, “Politica economica”, pp. 24-33, for a detailed account of the government debates, 
the opposition to the proposal and the political conflict that finally kept it from being 
implemented.  
17 De’Stefani, L’opera finanziaria del governo Fascista, (Speech given in Milan, 13 May 1923; 
printed in De’ Stefani, La Restaurazione Finanziaria, pp. 23-46).  
18 See Goad and Currey, The Working, p. 81, and The Economist, 22 March 1924, p. 642 (vol. 98, 
issue 4204).  
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suppressed the state monopoly of life insurance; it sold most State-owned telephone 
networks and services to private firms, reprivatized the metal machinery firm 
Ansaldo and awarded concessions for tolled motorways to private firms.19 All these 
operations conform neatly to the several types of privatization identified in recent 
academic literature, such as privatization by sale of State property, privatization by 
restitution, privatization by eliminating State monopolies without transfer of 
property,20 and externalization by means of concessions of services previously 
delivered by the government.21 
Contemporary economic analyses of privatization have so far overlooked the 
Fascist privatization policy in 1922-1925 Italy, which may well be the earliest case 
of large-scale privatization in a capitalist economy. Several studies in the 1920s22 
and 1930s23 noted the sale of the State-owned firms and the privatization of public 
monopolies by the first Mussolini government. However, the modern literature on 
privatization totally ignores this early case of privatization, and recent Italian 
literature on Fascist economic policy mentions it only in passing, if at all.24 It is 
worth noting, though, that a few specific case studies provide valuable information 
                                                 
19 Some accounts exist of privatization being implemented at the municipal level as well (Goad 
and Currey, The Working, p. 81, Perroux, “Économie corporative”, pp 1471-1472; Schiavi, “La 
municipalizzazione dei servizi pubblici”, p. 246). However the evidence in this field is anecdotal 
and is not really of central interest to us.  
20 For widely accepted typologies of privatization methods, see Brada, “Privatization is 
transition”, pp. 68-76; and Megginson and Netter, “From State to Market”, pp. 339-340.  
21 Vickers and Yarrow, “Economic perspectives”, p. 112, offer a rationale for considering 
contracting out as one type of privatization. See also Donahue, The privatization, p. 3; and Kay 
and Thompson, “Privatisation”, p. 18. 
22 Galluppi de Gregorio, “Il deficit”, p. 16; Gangemi, La Politica Economica; Perroux, 
Contribution a l’Étude, p. 140. 
23 Finer Mussolini’s Italy, p. 528; Gangemi, Le Società Anonime Miste ; Goad and Currey, The 
Working, p. 81; Guérin, Fascisme et grand capital, p. 178; Perroux, “Économie corporative”, pp. 
1469-1471; Schneider, The Fascist Government, p. 102; Welk, Fascist Economic Policy, p. 160.  
24 Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy, p. 224; De Grand, Italian Fascism, p. 47; dell’Orefice, “La 
politica industriale”, pp. 211-212; Fausto, “L’economia del fascismo”, p. 9; Sarti, Fascism , p. 
42; Zamagni, Lo Stato Italiano e l’Economia, p. 29.  
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on some of the privatization operations; for instance, the privatization of the 
telephones,25 the reprivatization of Ansaldo,26 and the concession of tolled 
motorways to private firms.27  
Privatization was an important policy in Italy in 1922-1925. The Fascist 
government was alone in transferring State ownership and services to private firms 
in the 1920s; no other country in the world would engage in such a policy until 
Nazi Germany did so between 1934 and 1937. So it is worth asking why the Fascist 
government departed from the mainstream approaches to State ownership in the 
1920s and transferred State-owned firms and businesses to the private sector.  
Answering this question requires us to analyze the objectives of the Fascists’ 
privatization policy. To do so, we will use the theories, concepts, and tools supplied 
by recent literature. Theoretical developments have provided valuable hypotheses 
regarding politicians’ motives in choosing between privatization and public 
ownership, and have identified various general objectives linked to privatization 
policies.28 Both the theoretical and the empirical literature offer interesting results 
regarding the use of privatization to build political support.29 Furthermore, 
international evidence suggests that financial motivations have also been a key 
factor in recent privatizations, although the relevance of sales receipts in triggering 
privatization has varied between countries and over time.30 Modern privatization 
has usually been accompanied by the removal of State direction and a wider role 
                                                 
25 Barone, “Politica economica”, pp. 33-39; Bottiglieri, SIP, pp. 80-93.  
26 Segreto, “La nuova Ansaldo”  
27 Bortolotti, “Origini e primordi”, pp. 53-57; and Bortolotti and De Luca, Fascismo e autostrade, 
pp. 46-52. 
28 Bel and Calzada, “Privatization”; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, “A theory of privatization”; 
Shleifer and Vishny, “Politicians and firms”; Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization; Vickers and 
Yarrow, “Economic perspectives”. 
29 Biais and Perotti, “Machiavellian privatization”; Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco, 
“Privatisation around the World”; Perotti, “Credible privatization”. 
30 Bortolotti and Milella, “Privatization in Western”; Yarrow, “A theory of privatization”. 
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for markets; so privatization and market liberalization have usually (though not 
always) gone together in recent privatization processes. 
This paper intends to fill a gap in the current economic literature by tracing the 
course of the privatization policy in 1922-1925 Italy. Our analysis suggests that the 
objectives pursued by the Fascist government were largely political, focused on the 
desire to build support for the government in the first period of Fascist rule in Italy. 
Fiscal objectives may also have played a role in the decision to privatize.  
From here onwards, the paper proceeds as follows. First, I examine the 
privatization process and its results. Then, I analyze the objectives of Fascist 
privatization. Finally, I draw the main conclusions. 
 
PRIVATIZATION IMPLEMENTED BY THE FIRST FASCIST 
GOVERNMENT IN ITALY 
 
Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister on October 28, 1922, after the March on 
Rome. The new government soon made clear its intention to privatize public 
services. The first meeting of the new Cabinet discussed the privatization of the 
telephone system and several other public services; the Minister of 
Communications, Colonna di Cesarò, proposed reprivatization in order to obtain 
resources and reduce Treasury spending.31 De’ Stefani, the Minister of Finance, 
quickly seconded the proposal, and the transfer of public services to private firms 
was approved. On November 14, the government also discussed and made public 
                                                 
31 Il Corriere della Sera, 8 November 1922, p. 1 
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its intention to abolish the regulations establishing a public monopoly over the 
operation of life insurance.32  
On December 3, 1922, legislation33 was passed delegating full powers to the 
government for the reform of the tax system and public administration. Article 1 of 
the new Act authorized the government to reform and simplify the tax system in 
order to adjust it to the needs of the budget and to improve tax distribution. The 
government was also empowered to reduce the functions of the State, reorganize 
the public bureaucracy, and reduce spending. The Act provided the legal 
framework within which the first Fascist government was to approve most of the 
decrees establishing the removal of public monopolies and the privatization of 
public services.  
Privatization of the monopoly on match sales: Italy’s first match factories 
appeared in the mid-nineteenth century, but it was only at the end of the century 
that the industry began to thrive when all the major factories gathered together in a 
single organization.34 On August 31, 1916, a decree35 was approved establishing 
the State monopoly over the sale of matches for consumption inside Italy. Match 
producers could now sell only to the State, and the Ministry of Finance was made 
responsible for managing the sales to the final consumers. The minister was also 
given powers to regulate the price and the product characteristics. The quantity of 
matches required to satisfy domestic consumption was calculated and divided 
among the producers, considering their respective market shares in the period 
1911-1913. 
                                                 
32 Il Corriere della Sera, 15 November 1922, p. 1.  
33 Law 1601/1922, of 3 December 1922, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of 15 December 
1922, number 293.  
34 Confederazione Fascista degli Industriali. L’Industria dell’Italia Fascista. p. 362. 
35 Decree (Decreto Legge) 1090/1916, of August 31 1916, regarding the monopoly on the sale of 
matches. 
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On March 11, 1923, Mussolini’s government approved a Royal Decree36 
eliminating the State monopoly on match sales as of June 1, 1923, and introducing 
a tax on match production. The decree established that the Minister of Finance 
would retain the power to set the price for sale to the final customers. With this 
decree, the agreement established on March 3, 1923 between the State and the 
Consortium of Match Producers for the sale of matches in Italy and its colonies 
also became law. The agreement established the transfer of the sale of matches to 
the producers in the Consortium, reaffirmed the State’s right to set the price of sale 
to the final consumers, and – significantly – prohibited the establishment of new 
factories for match production. The Minister of Finance De’ Stefani estimated the 
reduction in public spending due to the elimination of the match monopoly to be 65 
million lire.37  
Elimination of the public monopoly over life insurance: At the turn of the 
century, life insurance was a promising market controlled by foreign firms, which 
held 60% of insured capital and 70% of the premiums.38 Giolitti’s pre-war 
government decided to create a State monopoly on life insurance policies, and 
legislation was passed39 on April 4, 1912 establishing that life insurance policies, of 
any type, came under the monopoly of the Istituto Nazionale delle assicurazioni. 
The existing private insurers would keep the contracts already signed, and would 
                                                 
36 Royal Decree (Reggio Decreto) 560/1923, of 11 March 1923, published in the Gazzetta 
Ufficiale of 27 March 1923, number 72.  
37 De’Stefani, L’opera finanziaria, p. 38. By eliminating the monopoly the State would no longer 
receive public monopoly revenues, but the new tax on production would provide fiscal receipts to 
compensate for the losses. To my knowledge, Gangemi, La Politica Economica, pp. 211-214 is 
the only work that offers information on and analyzes this privatization. That information, 
published in 1924, was reproduced almost word-for-word in 1932 in Gangemi, Le Società 
Anonime Miste, pp. 267-270. Other contemporary works that reported (but did not discuss) the 
privatization of the match monopoly were Perroux, Contribution a l’Étude, p. 140, and Guérin, 
Fascisme et grand capital, p. 178.  
38 Battilossi, Annali, p. 206-207. 
39 Act 305/1912, April 4, 1912, regarding the establishment of a monopoly of life insurance in 
favour of the National Insurances Institute, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of April 12, 1912. 
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continue to receive the corresponding premiums. The private insurers that were 
providing life insurance on December 31, 1911 were authorized to remain in 
operation for ten more years after the 90th day following the implementation of the 
Act. However, firms wishing to remain in business for ten years were obliged to 
transfer to the State 40% of any new contract made after the law came into effect.40 
Two weeks after Mussolini’s accession to power, the Cabinet approved a 
decree41 on November 16 to maintain temporarily article 29 of the 1912 Act 
concerning the insurers already operating on December 31, 1911. Six months later, 
on April 29 1923, a Royal Decree42 authorized private insurers to operate in the life 
insurance business and repealed the 1912 Act establishing the public monopoly 
over life insurance.43 The two Italian companies that had pressed hardest to abolish 
the State monopoly became thereafter a de facto oligopoly, together with the 
business still in hands of the National Insurances Institute. 
Privatization of State-owned telephone networks and business: At the turn of 
the century, the State had awarded concessions to private firms, which owned and 
managed the country’s telephone sector. However, together with Spain, Italy had 
the most restrictive conditions for private concessions in the telephone business: 
concession periods were particularly short, and more importantly, conditions were 
onerous and restrictive.44 Although concessions were awarded for up to 25 years, 
the government could suspend them at will and could revoke the concession 
                                                 
40 The National Insurances Institute acquired the insurance portfolio of 23 Italian and foreign 
companies, and quickly achieved control of more than 40% of the insured capital in Italy 
(Battilossi, Annali, p. 206-207). 
41 Decree 1639/1922, of 16 November 1922. 
42 Royal Decree (Reggio Decreto) 966/1923 of 29 April 1923, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 
of May 14, 1923, number 112. 
43 Contemporary works that noted the privatization of the public monopoly over life insurance 
were Gangemi, La Politica Economica, p. 12; Perroux, Contribution a l’Étude, p. 140; Gangemi, 
Le Società Anonime Miste, p. 127.; and Guérin, Fascisme et grand capital, p. 178.  
44 Calvo, “The shaping of urban telephone networks”, pp. 429-430. 
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entirely after 12 years. Furthermore, once the concession expired, networks 
reverted to the State without compensation. By the 1907 Act the government 
nationalized most of the lines and networks managed by private firms, and took 
over the two most important private concessionaires in Italy: the Società generali 
italiana dei telefoni e applicazioni elettriche, and the Società telefonica alta Italia. 
45 So in 1907 the State became the main provider of telephone services, although a 
minor part of the sector remained in the hands of local private firms. In 1913, just 
over two-thirds of Italy’s telephones (61,978 in all) were publicly owned, and just 
under a third (29,742) were private. The situation in Italy reflected that in most 
European countries, where the State was the sole (or at least the predominant) 
provider of telephone services..46  
As mentioned above, the privatization of the State-owned telephone system was 
agreed at the first meeting of Mussolini’s government. A few months later, on 
February 8, 1923, the government approved a Royal Decree47 establishing the 
general conditions under which it could award concessions for the telephone 
service. The most important points in the decree were: (1) the possibility of 
awarding new concessions to private firms (art. 2); (2) the possibility that the 
government might renounce its right to recover the concession after at least 15 
years had elapsed (compared to 12 years in the previous legislation, art. 5); and (3) 
                                                 
45 Bottiglieri, SIP, p. 32. See Balbi, “Telefoni privati, telefoni pubblici”, for a recent and in-depth 
study of the nationalization of the telephone sector. 
46 For instance, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
and Switzerland had publicly owned monopolies managing the entire telephone service: 
Government ownership was hegemonic as well in the Netherlands (11.8% private) and Sweden 
(32.1% private, similar to Italy). Norway and European Russia had an almost 50-50% split 
between private and public. Instead, private ownership predominated in Denmark (under a 
competitive framework, used as well in the other Scandinavian countries) and in Spain and 
Portugal, under private monopoly concessions. (Wallsten, “Returning to Victorian Competition”, 
p.709, table 1).. 
47 Royal Decree (Reggio Decreto) 399/1923, of 8 February 1923, published in the Gazzetta 
Ufficiale of March 29, 1923, number 74.  
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the establishment of compensation once the concession expired if the government 
chose not to renew it and decided instead to take control of the business itself (art. 
8).  
After long conversations with the interested private firms,48 the government 
approved a new Royal Decree-Law,49 which incorporated several modifications. 
The main objective of the changes (arts. 2, 3 and 4) was to make privatization more 
appealing to private interests. For instance, the maximum time for which the 
government could renounce its right to recover a concession was increased to 20 
years, and the financial conditions for compensation were made more favorable to 
private firms (in the case of recovering a concession, and also in the case of the 
expiry and non-renewal of a concession). Furthermore, the taxes on profits that 
concessionaires had to pay to the State were lowered.  
Regarding the decision to privatize, the Italian producers of telephone 
equipment made a proposal to create a mixed (shared ownership) company in 
partnership with the State.50 However, the government decided to fully privatize the 
telephone sector. On September 19, 1924, the interested parties were invited to 
submit proposals before October 30 for six concession areas,51 and the successful 
bidders were to begin their management of the concession on July 1, 1925. Several 
bids were received for five of the areas, but only one bid was made for the sixth 
                                                 
48 See the Minutes of the Ministry of Communications on the first reactions of private operators 
to the project of concession of the telephone system (late 1923-early 1924). Printed in Bottiglieri, 
SIP, pp. 497-502. 
49 Royal Decree-Law (Reggio Decreto-Legge) 837/1924, of 4 May 1924, published in the 
Gazzetta Ufficiale of June 5, 1924, number 132.  
50 For full details on this proposal see Gangemi, Le Società Anonime Miste, pp. 129-134. 
51 Bottiglieri, SIP, pp. 88-89. These six zones were 1) Piemonte, Lombardia and Ligure; 2) Tre 
Venezie, Fiume and Zara; 3) Emilia, Marche, Umbria (excluding Orvieto), Abruzzi and Molise; 
4) Toscana, Lazio, Sardegna, and Orvieto area; 5) Southern Italy and Sicily; and 6) Interurban 
and international lines. When privatization was finally implemented, Ligure was moved from 
zone 1 to zone 4. Defining the zoning for privatization was one of the most complex tasks in the 
process. See more details in Barone, “Politica economica”, pp. 36-38. 
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one (main interurban lines and international lines) which was widely regarded as 
unprofitable.52 The final decision was announced on January 15 1925 and the five 
concessions for urban and regional areas were transferred to private firms,53 
including the ownership of the corresponding networks and equipments, for a total 
sum of 255.35 million lire.54 Because only one (unsatisfactory) proposal had been 
received for the interurban network, the competition was declared void and the 
service remained in the hands of the State under the management of the new 
Azienda di stato per i servici telefonici.55  
At the end of June 1925, before the privatization of the urban and regional 
networks, the State’s share of subscribers was 69.9% and it obtained 90.0% of 
revenues generated by urban and medium distance networks. In all (taking into 
account the revenues from long distance and international lines as well), the State 
enjoyed an 87.4% share of total revenues. After privatization came into effect in 
July  1925, all urban and regional networks were privately owned and managed, 
and private firms now received 68.9% of total revenues. The government’s share of 
the revenue fell to 31.1%.56 
Reprivatization of Ansaldo: Gio. Ansaldo & C. was a large producer of 
machinery such as boats, trains, airplanes, and naval equipment which had 
experienced impressive growth during World War I. After the war, Gio. Ansaldo 
embarked on an overambitious expansion program which ultimately led the firm to 
                                                 
52 Bottiglieri, SIP, p. 91; Sarti, Fascism , p. 46. 
53 By the end of the 1920s, the five regional concessions had consolidated into two big 
companies, Stipel and Set, linked to the two major industrial and financial Italian holdings, the 
Comit and the Credit (Bottiglieri, SIP, p. 88). 
54 Barone, “Politica economica”, p. 37. 
55 Royal Decree-Law (Reggio Decreto-Legge) 884/1925, of 14 June 1925, regarding the 
constitution of the Azienda per i servizi telefonici, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of June 17, 
1925, number 139.  
56 I have made these computations based on data in Bottiglieri, SIP, pp. 438-439, Table A/2. 
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bankruptcy in 1921.57 The government decided to rescue the firm by means of the 
Sezione Autonoma del Consorzio sovvenzioni su valori industriali (CSVI, 
dependent on the Bank of Italy), which had been set up with the mission of 
rescuing banks in crisis.58 Ansaldo SA was created in September 1922, with a 
capital of 200 million lire, subscribed by Gio. Ansaldo (199.75 million lire) and 
Banca Nazionale di Credito (0.25 million lire). Because the firm could not 
effectively make such a big investment, the CSVI put forward the sum needed and 
received Ansaldo SA shares as collateral for its funding. However, lengthy 
negotiations between Gio. Ansaldo and the Ministry of Finance continued 
throughout 1922 regarding the payment of Ansaldo’s tax debts.59  
Mussolini was highly sensitive to all matters regarding military production, and 
once in government he provided strong support for the firm’s rescue.60 In February 
1923, an agreement was finally reached and Ansaldo was placed under public 
control, which implied the direct involvement of the State in the firm’s 
management.61 Under public control (between 1922 and 1925), Ansaldo received 
continued financial support from the CSVI, which amounted to 300 million in the 
first year and a half.62 Ansaldo was reprivatized in July 1925, following an offer 
made by an alliance between Banca Nazionale di Credito and Credito Italiano of 
210 million lire for all shares (5% above their face value). The State received 207.5 
                                                 
57 Ansaldo had 6,000 workers before the War, but this figure increased up to 56,000, plus other 
50,000 workers in filial firms (Zamagni, Lo Stato Italiano e l’Economia, pp. 25-27). 
58 The main rescuing operations undertaken by the Autonomous Section of CVSI in 1922 and 
1923 were those affecting Banca Italiana di Sconto (unsuccessful) and Banco di Roma. By the 
end of 1924, CSVI had an outstanding debt of around 4,000 million lire to the Bank of Italy 
(Lombardini, “Italian fascism and the economy”, p. 158). Einaudi (“La sistemazione 
dell’Ansaldo”, p. 127) saw this rescue as a mean to help the rescue of Banca di Sconto, Ansaldo’s 
main creditor. 
59 Segreto, “La nuova Ansaldo”, p. 47-48.  
60 Doria, Ansaldo, p. 190. 
61 Gangemi, Le Società Anonime Miste, p. 154.  
62 Segreto, “La nuova Ansaldo”, p. 49. For a detailed account of the support given by the State to 
Ansaldo, see Gangemi, La Politica Economica, p. 297-230. 
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million for its shares, with an up-front payment of 41.5 million lire, while the 
remaining 166 million lire were to be paid in five years at an annual interest rate of 
5%.63 
Concession of tolled motorways to private firms: In 1923, the Ministry of 
Public Works was reformed with the objective of stimulating cooperation between 
the State and private firms – particularly the large electricity companies – for the 
promotion of public works. This reform allowed the expansion of the concessions 
system, and provided great legal flexibility, allowing public works such as the 
building of the motorways to be carried out either by the State or by means of 
concessions to private firms.64 In practice, the reform excluded the cooperatives for 
production and labour from executing public works, which were thereafter awarded 
to private firms by means of concessions.65 More importantly, it provided the 
framework for implementing a new policy for funding and managing the 
motorways: the concession of construction and operation to private firms, which 
would receive a toll paid by motorway users as the main source of income to 
finance the new motorways. 
Indeed, from the earliest days of the Fascist government, the construction of the 
motorway system was based on the granting of concessions to private firms. In 
April 1922, Piero Puricelli, owner of a large motorway construction firm and a 
strong supporter of Fascism, had unsuccessfully launched a plan for the building of 
a motorway. However, soon after Mussolini’s appointment as Prime Minister, the 
government worked out an agreement with a private firm created by Puricelli in 
December 1922, and awarded his firm the right to build and operate a motorway 
                                                 
63 Segreto, “La nuova Ansaldo”, pp. 52-54, offers a detailed account of the reprivatization 
process. 
64 Buccella, “Le autovie nel sistema dei trasporti”, p. 745. 
65 Perroux, “Économie corporative”, pp. 1469-1471. 
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between Milan and the pre-Alpine lakes.66 The State provided the guarantee for the 
bonds issued by the concessionaire, and a subsidy to the firm. The first part of the 
Milano-laghi motorway was completed in September 1924 and the second in 
September 1925;67 it was the first tolled motorway in the world. 
As a rule, thereafter the State awarded concessions to private firms for the 
building and operation of motorways for a period of fifty years. Because of the low 
demand, the State provided an annual subsidy, in addition to the contributions 
made by local governments with an interest in the motorway. The private 
concessionary issued bonds guaranteed by the State and the local governments. As 
a result, the investment made by the private firm represented a small fraction of all 
the capital needed to build the motorway,68 and obtaining financial support from 
the State was usually a necessary precondition for construction.69 
Beginning in 1923, six tolled motorways were constructed in a short space of 
times. Milano-laghi was followed by Milano-Bergamo, and by several others 
(Napoli-Pompeia, Brescia-Bergamo, Torino-Milano, Firenze-mare, Venezia-
Padova, etc.). But the traffic was not enough to cover costs, and most concessions 
were nationalized in the 1930s to save the firms from financial collapse.70 Only 
Napoli-Pompeia, Torino-Milano and Venezia-Padova remained in private hands 
(the last one thanks to massive subsidies provided by local governments).71 The 
State kept tolls in place after taking over the motorways.  
                                                 
66 Moraglio, “Per una storia”, p. 15. The rapid concession and the high financial commitment 
provided by the State came in for criticism, for economic reasons (Bortolotti and De Luca, 
Fascismo e autostrade, p. 46). 
67 Bortolotti, “Origini e primordi”, p. 47; Bortolotti and De Luca, Fascismo e autostrade, p. 46. 
68 Moraglio, “L’autostrada Torino-Milano”, pp. 103-104. 
69 De Luca, “La costruzione”, p. 75. 
70 Greco and Ragazzi, “History and regulations”, p. 121. The Azienda Autonoma Statale delle 
Strada, created in 1928, was responsible for the operation of the nationalized tollways. 
71 Moraglio, “Per una storia”, p. 23. 
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Between late 1922 and mid-1925 the bulk of the Mussolini government’s 
privatization plans were put into practice. After July 1925, when De’ Stefani was 
replaced by Count Volpi di Missurata as Minister of Finance, Fascist privatization 
came to an end and a new phase of Fascist economic policy in Italy began, 
characterized by tighter, more direct intervention by the government in economic 
affairs.72  
 
WHY DID THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZE? AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
Contemporary scholars – from both Italy and abroad – noted the implementation of 
several of privatization operations in the country in the mid 1920s. However, no 
full analysis of this policy has been published to date. Apart from the few specific 
case-studies on some of the privatization operations, no in-depth analyses have 
been carried out of the role played by privatization in the first phase of the Fascist 
economic policy, implemented between 1922 and 1925.  
 Actually, the first Fascist manifesto, the Programma dei Fasci di 
Combattimento adopted in March 1919,73 demanded a series of reforms that 
included a heavy capital levy, a punitive tax on war profits, minimum wage rates, 
                                                 
72 De Grand, Italian Fascism, p. 58; Fausto, “L’economia del fascismo”, p. 9; Gregor, 
Mussolini’s Intellectuals, p. 107; Welk, Fascist Economic Policy, p. 163-164.  
73 This manifesto was published in Popolo d’Italia on June 6, 1919, reprinted in De Felice, 
Autobiografia del Fascismo, pp. 26-27. 
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and workers’ participation in industrial management.74 Indeed, the earliest Fascist 
programs rejected private ownership and industrial interests, consistent with the 
fact that most first-hour Fascists had previously been members of the radical Left in 
the Partito Socialista Italiano. Mussolini himself had been a massimalista within 
the PSI, and was director of Avanti – the party newspaper – between November 
1912 and October 1914, one month before his expulsion from the PSI.  
 However, the Fascist position on economic policy had changed dramatically by 
the early 1920s. In his first speech as a member of the Italian Parliament in June 
1921, Mussolini said: “The State must have a police, a judiciary, an army, and a 
foreign policy. All other things, and I do not exclude secondary education, must go 
back to the private activity of individuals. If one wants to save the State, the 
Collectivist State must be abolished.”75 Mussolini confirmed this new political 
orientation towards State ownership in a speech given in November 1921:  
“Regarding the economy we are explicitly antisocialist… I will give the railways 
and the telegraphs back to private hands, because the current state of things is 
outrageous and vulnerable in all its parts. The ethical State is not the monopolistic 
State, the bureaucratic State, but the one which reduces its functions to what is 
strictly necessary. We are against the economic State.” 76  
 Mussolini’s views were formally adopted as Fascist policy in the PNF’s 
program of December 1921.77 The section ‘Economic reconstruction of the 
country’ emphasized two of the party’s main economic objectives: 1) to return 
industrial companies such as the telephone system and the railways to private firms 
                                                 
74 The program of the Fasci di combattimento was more moderate than the economic and social 
program adopted by the Nazi Party in 1920, which proposed the nationalization of banks and 
industrial trusts (Bel, “Against the mainstream”, p. 13). 
75 Mussolini, “Il Primo Discorso alla Camera”, 21 June 1921. Printed in Mussolini, Scritti e 
Discorsi II (pp. 165-188), p. 187 (author’s translation). 
76 Mussolini, “Discorso all’Augusteo”, 7 November 1921. Printed in Mussolini, Scritti e Discorsi 
II (pp. 199-206), pp. 203-204 (author’s translation). 
77 Partito Nazionale Fascista, Programma e Statuti.  
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(point 8); and 2) to give up the monopoly on Postal and Telegraph services, and to 
allow private initiative to enter the sector and eventually replace the State service 
(point 9).  
 Throughout 1922, Mussolini repeated his intention to privatize in a series of 
influential speeches. To quote from his speech at Udine, in September 1922, one 
month before the March on Rome:  “We must put an end to the Railway State, to 
the Postal State, to the Insurance State. We must put an end to the State that wastes 
the money of all Italian taxpayers and worsens the exhausted finances of the Italian 
State.” 78 Indeed, this was the road taken by the Fascist government from its first 
days in office, and confirmed by Mussolini in his influential speech of 18 March, 
1923 to the II International Congress of the Chamber of Commerce in Rome: “The 
economic directions of the new Italian government are simple. I believe that the 
State must give up all its economic functions, particularly those of a monopolistic 
character.” 79 
Ideology 
 Indeed, both Mussolini’s position on State ownership and the Fascist proposals 
for economic policy had undergone dramatic change between 1919 and 1921-22. 
Was this change due to Mussolini’s conversion to liberal ideology? Apparently not, 
for Mussolini was proud to affirm that “the value of Fascism lies in its pragmatic 
nature”. 80 Above all, he was a tactician, and was regarded as such both by 
contemporary analysts81 and by modern scholars.82 James Gregor spells this out: 
“To anyone who knew anything about Mussolini, it was clear that there was little 
                                                 
78 Mussolini, “Il Discorso di Udine”, 20 September 1922. Printed in Mussolini, Scritti e Discorsi 
II (pp. 307-322), pp. 320 (author’s translation). 
79 Mussolini, “Le Nuove Direttive Economiche”, 18 March 1923. Printed in Mussolini, Scritti e 
Discorsi III (pp. 89-91), p. 89 (author’s translation).  
80 Mussolini, “Fascismo. Dottrine”, p. 850. 
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82 De Felice, Mussolini il Fascista. I, pp. 309-403; De Grand, Italian Fascism, p. 42; Sarti, 
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that was conservative, liberal, or politically democratic about his most fundamental 
convictions. Through all his phases of political apprenticeship, Mussolini had 
always been an elitist, as well as a singularly antidemocratic revolutionary.”83 
 To be sure, a pro-private business ideology was firmly embedded in Mussolini’s 
first government, particularly in the person of De’ Stefani.84 De’ Stefani was 
initially appointed Minister of Finance, but took over from Tangorra as Treasury 
Minister on the latter’s death in December 1922; the two ministries were merged 
and De’ Stefani was placed in charge of all economic matters. His economic credo 
was driven by his strong pro-private business views,85 which resulted in a policy 
oriented to promoting productivity.86 Among the cornerstones of this policy was the 
privatization of State-owned firms and the elimination of State monopolies.  
 Nonetheless, De’ Stefani’s privatization did not imply a policy in favor of 
competition.87 The clearest expression of his views on privatization and 
competition is found in a text he published in 1941, when commenting on the 
newly coined term88 ‘reprivatization’:  
“This is another clumsy word that has come into use. Although it is difficult to 
pronounce, it is steadily making its way. Reprivatization should mean a return to 
                                                 
83 Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals, p. 100. 
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private initiative, rather than a return to economic freedom. To avoid confusion, 
this distinction must not be forgotten; otherwise economic liberalism could use 
reprivatization as a launch pad for having its own trafficking passed through…. 
That it is not possible to go back to economic liberalism and, thus, to competition, 
seems beyond dispute.”  89  
 Accordingly, the removal of the match sale monopoly was accompanied by the 
prohibition of new firms entering the market to produce matches, thus reinforcing 
the private monopoly on match production and sale. Privatization of the State 
telephone networks and installations was done through regional monopolies, but no 
room was given to competition - in contrast to countries like Denmark and Sweden, 
where the telephone systems were totally or partially private and a liberal market 
approach prevailed. After privatization, the telephone sector evolved towards an 
oligopoly of the two largest groups, Stipel and Set. The same thing happened with 
the private sector for life insurance, and competition was never a concern for the 
Fascist government.90 
 Political interests 
 While De’ Stefani’s economic policy was consistent with his ideological views 
on public and private ownership, Mussolini had other reasons as well to back this 
course of action during his first government. The main one was the desire to 
                                                 
89 De’ Stefani, “Reprivatizzazione”, p. 1205 (author’s translation). This text is De’ Stefani’s 
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increase political support for Fascism. Mussolini’s change of attitude towards 
private business was a consequence of the party’s heavy defeat in the autumn 1919 
national elections when, running on the basis of the interventionist program of the 
Fasci di Combattimento the PNF obtained just a few thousand votes in Milan, 
where Mussolini himself was the PNF candidate. After this setback, he began to 
adopt more pro-private stances in economic matters. His reasons were primarily 
tactical: he wanted to establish his party as an alternative to the mainstream parties 
and sought support from sectors such as middle classes, typically averse to strong 
State intervention in the economy91 and strongly opposed to the socialist economic 
policies applied by the Russian Bolsheviks, which had caused the collapse of the 
Russian economy.92  
 Indeed, electoral support for the Fascists increased in the 1921 election, when 
the PNF obtained 35 seats in the national parliament out of a total of 535 seats.93 
Support to PNF was strongest among landowners, small businessmen, and middle 
class professionals, and competition for votes was especially intense with the 
Catholic Partito Popolari Italiano.94 The PNF’s electoral support was much weaker 
among industrial and agricultural workers – who remained loyal to the Socialist 
Party and to other parties of the Left or with a strong working-class base – and 
among big industrialists, who backed the conventional conservative parties.95 As 
regards financial support, small industries and landowners made significant 
contributions to the PNF before the March on Rome, but far less was forthcoming 
from industry,96 where subsidies were sporadically given to avoid trouble in the 
                                                 
91 Guarneri, Battaglie economiche, pp. 104-105. 
92 Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals, p. 100. 
93 Eatwell, Fascism. A History, p. 49.  
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factories.97 Hardly any large-scale industrialists supported the March on Rome,98 
preferring a government headed either by Giolitti or by Salandra (with Mussolini in 
the Cabinet) as a way out of the political crisis.99 Eventually, however, Mussolini 
was appointed Prime Minister.  
 Mussolini’s accession to power in October 1922 was the result of a compromise 
between Fascism and the traditional ruling class. As a result, Mussolini’s 
government until 1925 was a coalition, in which only three out of thirteen ministers 
were members of the PNF and seven of the remaining ten belonged to conservative 
and centre parties that had been involved in the previous government, plus two 
members of the army and one independent.100   
 With only a small fraction of the parliament belonging to the PNF,101 the 
political strength of Fascism was never enough to pursue its most favoured policies. 
Given the allies with whom he cohabitated and the type of public opinion that 
supported him,102 Mussolini was in no position to pursue an economic policy other 
than one that first and foremost encouraged productivity.103 In the April 1924 
election, after a campaign plagued by corruption and intimidation, the national list 
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promoted by Mussolini and the PNF won a substantial majority, with 374 elected 
representatives, 275 of whom belonged to the PNF.104 But the political situation 
was anything but stable, in spite of this convincing victory. Giacomo Matteotti, 
parliamentary leader of the moderate Socialists, was kidnapped and murdered after 
a forthright speech in Parliament in June 1924 in which he demanded that the 
election be declared void because of widespread coercion and electoral fraud. A 
Fascist squad with direct links to the government leaders was responsible for 
Matteotti’s murder. A huge political crisis ensued during the second half of 1924 
and almost brought down the first Fascist government. This was Mussolini’s 
weakest moment throughout his tenure as Prime Minister.105  
 Within this framework of limited political strength, during his first years in 
government Mussolini sought to increase his support. So far, major industrialists 
had largely treated Fascism with hostility or suspicion,106 as Mussolini himself 
noted in an interview a few years later: “Resistance came mainly from the upper 
classes, but not from the aristocracy.”107 The Fascists set out to obtain the support 
of the industrialists by means of the economic policy.108 Measures such as the 
privatization of State-owned firms and the removal of State monopolies –policies 
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that favored private property– most probably used as tools to build confidence 
among the industrialists, and to foster an alliance between them and Fascism.109  
 The Matteotti crisis was the biggest challenge that the first Fascist government 
had to face. Confronted with the real possibility of losing power, Mussolini set up a 
personal dictatorship, which was supported by most of his political allies.110 The 
speech given to parliament on January 3, 1925 is the crucial moment in this 
evolution, and marked the moment of real political rupture,111 and the beginning of 
the totalitarian phase of Fascism. Following the speech of January 3, the 
representatives of the opposition were not allowed to return to parliament and the 
opposition parties and trade unions were outlawed.112 All this marked the end to the 
first phase of Fascist rule. As plainly expressed by Alfredo Rocco,113 “From 
October 28, 1922 to January 3, 1925 Fascism did not govern Italy alone; it 
governed Italy in collaboration with other parties. This collaboration, initially very 
wide-ranging, was gradually restricted; with the January 3 speech any residual 
notion of coalition government was swept away, and Fascism alone controlled the 
State.”  
 On the economic front, on January 23, 1925 the Gran Consiglio del Fascismo 
(Fascism Grand Council), the PNF’s highest body, announced that all the economic 
forces of the nation would thereafter be ‘integrated into the life of the State’.114 
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New legislation was passed on April 3, 1926115 regarding the functioning of 
markets to empower the Fascist State to direct the economy, and thus introduced a 
trend towards strong interventionism. The two main bases for State intervention 
were (1) the institutes and corporations that were created in the mid-1920s,116 
through which the Fascist State regulated the economy,117 and (2) the Carta del 
Lavoro (Chapter of Labour), declared in April 1927, which made it explicit that 
private enterprise was subordinate to the State whenever political interests were 
involved.118 The corporative system was based on intervention in economic activity 
and its regulation.119 In this way, an anti-market government came to accept 
privatization, because it was able to retain control over private ownership through 
ever stronger regulation.120  
 Fiscal objectives 
 Fiscal reform, designed primarily to balance the budget and reform the tax 
system, was the most powerful single driver of Fascist economic policy between 
1922 and 1925.121 In his first speech to parliament as prime minister, Mussolini 
stated that “The financial problem is the crucial problem: we must balance the State 
budget as soon as possible.”122 De’ Stefani proved to be the right man for the task, 
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as his policies reduced public expenditure and nominally increased tax revenues.123 
According to Répaci’s adjustments of the official budget accounts, the fiscal year 
1925-1926 was the first (and last) one in which a real budget surplus (albeit 
modest) was achieved.124 The result in late 1925 of the renegotiation of the foreign 
debt to the US and to the United Kingdom represented a massive boost: recent 
evaluations by Francese and Pace estimate the reduction of the foreign debt to have 
been as high as  80% and indeed attribute the reduction of public debt in Italy in 
1925 exclusively to this effect.125   
 Indeed, given De’ Stefani’s emphasis on balancing the budget, privatization was 
a tool that was likely to serve this purpose as well.126 In the case of the telephone 
system, the Minister of Communications Colonna di Cesarò proposed privatization 
in order to obtain resources and to reduce Treasury spending. Indeed, the sale of the 
State-owned networks and installations transferred to private hands yielded 255.35 
million lire and relieved the State of the responsibility of providing the investment 
needed for the modernization of the system, estimated at around 200 million lire 
                                                 
123 However, it remained relatively stable as a percentage of GDP. Fausto, “La finanza pubblica 
Fascista”, p. 609, table A.2, contains detailed data on fiscal receipts and public spending for all 
years of Fascist rule.  
124 Répaci, La finanza pubblica italiana, pp. 125 and 142, tables 33 & 34. Fausto, “La finanza 
pubblica Fascista”, pp. 601-602, points out that the ‘Cash’ budget recorded a surplus in 1924-25 
and 1925-26.  
125 Francese and Pace, Il debito pubblico italiano, pp. 19 and 38. Contemporary authors paid a 
great deal of attention to the debt renegotiation. Gangemi, La politica finanziaria, pp. 218-219, 
estimates that total debt was reduced from 130,000 million lire to 18,000 million lire, to be paid 
in 62 years. McGuire, Italy’s International Economic Position, pp. 202-203, contains another 
contemporary evaluation of the debt agreements.  
126 For the fiscal year 1925-1926, the privatization of the telephone system and the reprivatization 
of Ansaldo yielded a total of 462.85 million lire to the State, a figure equivalent to 2.3% of the 
State’s fiscal receipts. Data on proceeds from these privatization operations are documented 
above. Data on fiscal receipts have been obtained from Répaci, La finanza pubblica italiana, p. 
142, table 34, and Fausto, “La finanza pubblica Fascista”, p. 609, table 2. 
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per year for a decade.127 De’ Stefani also stressed the reduction of public spending 
due to the removal of the public monopoly on match sales, estimated at 65 million 
lire.128 As for the concession of public works and private tolled motorways, the 
Ministry of Public Works saw it as a way of guaranteeing the construction of this 
important new infrastructure without an immediate impact on the budget; the 
budgetary effects would vary over time129 due to future direct expenditure and 
subsidies to private firms.130  
 The privatization of State-owned businesses, the privatization and elimination of 
public monopolies, and the concessions to private firms for the construction and 
operation of the motorways were measures that suited the fiscal policy of the first 
Fascist government particularly well. Fiscal objectives, usually present in one way 
or another in privatization policies,131 appear to have been an influential factor in 
the Fascist privatization drive of the 1920s.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Though overlooked by most of the modern economic literature, a large-scale 
privatization policy was applied by the first Fascist government in Italy between 
1922 and 1925. The State monopoly on match sales was privatized; the State 
                                                 
127 Gangemi, Le Società Anonime Miste, p. 134. After privatization, the state needed only to 
invest in the long distance network, and relied on the private concessionaries for investment in 
urban and regional networks (Antinori, Le telecomunicazioni, pp. 51-52). 
128 De’Stefani, L’opera finanziaria del governo Fascista, p. 38 (Speech given in Milan, 13 May 
1923; printed in De’ Stefani, La Restaurazione Finanziaria, pp. 23-46).  
129 Because of the impact of these procedures on future budgets, De’ Stefani became increasingly 
worried by the indiscriminate use of concessions (Barone, “Politica economica”, pp. 17-19). 
130 According to Bortolotti and De Luca, Fascismo e autostrade, p. 42, the decision to continue 
with concessions in the second half of the 1920s, during the years of economic crisis, suggests 
that motorway concessions were used as a way to provide jobs for unemployed workers, by 
means of heavy public subsidies. 
131 Yarrow, ‘A theory of privatization’. 
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monopoly on life insurance was eliminated; most State-owned telephone networks 
and services were sold to private firms; one large producer of metal machinery was 
reprivatized, and several concessions for tolled motorways were awarded to private 
firms.  
Ideological motivations may have played a role in Fascist privatization. De’ 
Stefani, responsible for the government’s economic policy, was a convinced 
believer in private ownership and was ardently pro-business, although he did not 
believe in free markets and competition. However, ideology was not Mussolini’s 
main reason for promoting a privatization policy such as the one applied by his first 
government. Fascists used privatization as a mean to improve confidence in their 
policies among the industrialists, and thus to increase the backing from this major 
sector. Achieving this support was vital to Mussolini because the industrialists had 
not been strong supporters of Fascism before Mussolini accession to government, 
and, during his first period of government between 1922 and 1925 the Fascists 
lacked the political strength necessary to apply their most preferred policies. Last, 
but not least, financial motivations also played a role. The receipts from selling 
public firms and taxation on privatized monopolies, as well as the expenditure 
saved through monopoly privatization and concessions, represented another useful 
tool for pursuing the key economic objective of the first phase of Fascism, that is, 
balancing the budget. 
The privatization policy of the Fascists in Italy was probably the first to be 
implemented in a capitalist economy in the twentieth century. It provides an 
interesting illustration of how different and compatible objectives can be pursued 
through privatization, since it was used to pursue political objectives and to foster 
alliances with large-scale industrialists, as well as to obtain resources in order to 
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balance the budget. In a striking parallelism with the Nazi privatization policy132 
implemented one decade later, the Fascist government also used privatization and 
regulation as partial substitutes. While relinquishing its power over the privatized 
services and the ownership of firms, the Fascist government retained control over 
the markets by establishing more restrictive regulations and via the creation of 
government-dependent institutions, which implemented market regulations.  
Privatization was applied in 1920s Italy and in 1930s Germany. Nevertheless, 
neither the Fascist nor the Nazi economic policy implied liberalization or support 
for competition, or the reduction of State control over the market. Firm owners 
were free to organize production as they wished, but their activity in the market 
was subject to strong State control. Indeed, privatization by anti-market 
governments does not significantly reduce State intervention in the economy. The 
study of interwar privatization in Europe offers interesting lessons on how 
authoritarian and totalitarian governments implemented their policies. Future 
research should focus on the differences between dictatorial and democratic 
privatization.  
 
                                                 
132 See Bel, “Against the mainstream”. 
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